

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 101730
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:RPOST:SLB:CHG

APPROVED BY P - MR NEWSOM

NEA: NAVELIOTES

EA/ARP:JWTTWINAM

AF:WHARROP

EUR:WLUERS

ARA/CCA - MR BOWEN

S/S-O:SRPVALERGA

NSC - MR AARON

-----116825 210320Z /70

O 210152Z APR 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 101730

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS,PINT, SA, ET

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN ERITREA

REF: DHAHRAN 525

1. AMBASSADOR SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING IN RESPONDING
TO PRINCE SAUD'S EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT ERITREA AND
HIS QUERY ABOUT U.S. REACTION TO POSSIBLE SOVIET AND
CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION IN ERITREA.
FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ARE INTENDED BOTH TO BRING SAG
UP TO DATE ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF EVENTS IN THE HORN AND
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TO EMPHASIZE OUR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE
CONSULTATION WITH THE SAUDI ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

2. U.S. IS WATCHING CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS IN ETHIOPIA AND
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THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR OUR OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF
FOREIGN TROOPS IN ERITREA DURING HIS VISIT TO LAGOS EARLIER

THIS MONTH, AND THE SECRETARY AT THE RECENT CENTO MEETING IN LONDON UNDERSCORED OUR OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE IN AFRICA. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR IN PUBLIC THAT WE FULLY SUPPORT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ERITREA,

WHETHER THROUGH MEDIATION, NEGOTIATION OR OTHER MEANS, WHICH BRINGS ABOUT A RESULT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH ETHIOPIA AND THE ERITREANS. WE WOULD HOPE SAUDIS COULD PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORTING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND WOULD LIKE THEIR ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS AND HOW WE MIGHT BEST PROCEED TO FOSTER ONE.

3. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT BOTH SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS RECOGNIZE THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION BY THEM IN ERITREA WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL MORE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY THAN THEIR ROLE IN THE OGADEN, WHICH COULD BE CLAIMED TO BE AID TO A FRIENDLY COUNTRY WHICH HAD BEEN INVADDED. BOTH SOVIETS AND CUBANS HAVE GIVEN INDICATIONS OF THEIR PREFERENCE FOR A NEGOTIATED OR MEDIATED END TO THE ERITREAN PROBLEM. IT IS, HOWEVER, EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THAT MENGISTU IS PREPARED TO ABANDON THE POSSIBILITY OF CRUSHING THE ERITREAN REVOLT MILITARILY. HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY PRESSING THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS TO SUPPORT SUCH AN EFFORT WITH A SPECIFIC COMMITMENT OF CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS TO THE ERITREAN CONFLICT. WHILE BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS HAVE A CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT, BOTH
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5. THE CUBANS, MOREOVER, WHILE PERFECTLY CAPABLE OF IGNORING MOST WORLD OPINION, DO SET CONSIDERABLE STORE BY THEIR RELATIONS WITH SO-CALLED "PROGRESSIVE" ARAB STATES AND BY THEIR OWN STANDING IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). WE HAVE REPORTS THAT SOME COUNTRIES IN THESE CATEGORIES HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE CUBANS THAT

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY IO/UNA:BJSHARP
APPROVED BY IO/UNA:JFTEFFT
S/S-O:DSUMMERS

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R 221900Z APR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 101730

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOL RPT STATE 101730 SENT ACTION DHAHRAN & JIDDA DTD 21 APR 78

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 101730

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E.O. 11652: GDS

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SUBJECT: SITUATION IN ERITREA

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66011
DRAFTED BY:AF/E:KPGARLAND
APPROVED BY:AF/E:RPOST

NEA/*:APR:JWTTWINAM (TEL)

S/S-O:DROBINSON

-----055999 261157Z /13

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO HORN OF AFRICA COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 101730

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 101730 INFO USUN NEW YORK DATED APRIL 20, 1978

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INTERVENTION, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BRIEFING MATERIALS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MILITARY EXERCISES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE101730
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Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: RPOST:SLB:CHG
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780170-0419
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780430/aaaaayxl.tel
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Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
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Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
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Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 78 DHAHRAN 525
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
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TAGS: MASS, PINT, MOPS, SA, ET, US
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Type: TE
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Sheryl P. Walter
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US Department of State
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20 Mar 2014
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